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T
he Institute of Medicine (IOM) identified six core needs in
a health care system, the first of which was safety.
1
Furthermore, several IOM committees and others have identi-
fied the creation of a “culture of safety” as the key institutional
requirement to achieve safe medical care.
1–3 In this issue of the
journal, Modak et al.
4 present an instrument that may help
measure the extent to which a patient safety culture exists in
an ambulatory setting. While these authors and others have
done considerable work on defining and measuring a culture of
safety in the hospital setting,
5,6 few have tackled the difficult
task of measuring a safety culture in the ambulatory arena
within the US health care system. Even in the hospital setting,
where there has been more effort, the development of a culture
of safety within all US hospitals has been spotty and, for some
safety advocates, too slow.
7
There are many potential reasons for the poor progress in
developing a culture of safety: confusion about the difference
between safety and quality, concerns that increasing safety will
further erode profits, or perhaps simply a lack of attention by
institutional leaders. Whatever the reasons for the slow pace of
transformation across the nation’s 5,000-plus hospitals, it is
likely that this transformation will be even more difficult to
achieve in the much larger and more diverse ambulatory
setting. Thus, it is important to define and measure an
ambulatory culture of safety.
It is also difficult, perhaps impossible, to change beliefs,
attitudes, knowledge, or actions (all components of a “cul-
ture”) without some form of feedback. Therefore, a necessary
step in creating a culture of safety is to develop tools to
measure the components of that culture. For those individ-
uals and institutions that wish to truly improve the safety of
the care they deliver, the creation and testing of tools such as
the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire-Ambulatory (SAQ-A) ver-
sion is critical. Beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge do not
always lend themselves to clear-cut end points. Thus, we
can expect to see more than one safety culture measurement
instrument developed over the next several years. For in-
stance, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is
also supporting the development of an instrument for use in
the ambulatory setting, which is adapted from a number of
hospital-oriented safety instruments. This adapted instru-
ment should be ready for field testing early in 2007. As
various ambulatory safety culture instruments are developed
and evaluated, one can hope that a rich dialogue concerning
the differences and similarities will ensue. Over time, the
critical domains to measure, the scope and number of
individuals to survey, and the interpretation of results should
emerge. The Modak paper has added to and advanced this
much-needed conversation.
Many clinicians and office administrators may question the
need for measuring a culture of safety. They consider this to be
primarily an academic enterprise—as in irrelevant. Clinicians
and administrators find it hard to believe that their attitudes,
knowledge, beliefs, and actions support unsafe medical care.
However, evidence to the contrary continues to surface. In the
recent tragedy involving the deaths of newborns in the
neonatal unit of an Indiana hospital,
8 the hospital adminis-
tration’s initial response was that this was clearly the result of
human error. I was asked by several media outlets to comment
on the events. To prepare for the interviews, I called a hospital
pharmacy where I work to determine how similar the two vials
of heparin are. The pharmacist indicated that they are similar
enough that several years ago our pharmacy decided to buy
these two strengths of heparin from different manufacturers so
that the vials would look very different. Yes, this was a bit more
work, but they believed it was an essential step needed to
decrease the likelihood of an identification error. This organi-
zation demonstrated a culture of safety.
Another situation that indicates the presence or lack of a
culture of safety is the handling of after-hours phone calls.
Over the past several years, my colleagues and I have
published a series of papers on the potential risks of policies
related to the handling of after-hours phone calls by patients to
primary care physicians.
9 Despite attention in the medical
literature
10 and the public press,
11,12 our last analysis of
physician offices in a number of cities across the country
indicated that over 50% of offices use the same unsafe system
we identified. In fact, even after we sent a number of offices in
Denver, Colorado the original paper with a brief letter about
how easy it was to correct the problem, 6 months later, only
two had changed how they handled calls. I doubt if these
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155offices believe that they are providing unsafe care or have
concerns about their culture of safety. Here is where it will be
informative to correlate an office’s safety culture score with its
decisions to act or not act when presented with information of
this type. Other examples of clearly unsafe practices being
accepted by clinicians, staff, and administrators abound at
the hospital and ambulatory level. With the increasing
complexity of medical care coupled with increasingly frag-
mented care, we desperately need to examine and understand
our beliefs, our attitudes, our actions—our culture—con-
cerning safety.
The SAQ-A builds on the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire for
hospitals, which has been used in a number of safety-related
studies. The authors’ work on adapting this instrument for
ambulatory use is to be applauded. Nevertheless, as they note,
this report is only a first step. Over one-third of the questions
from the hospital survey dropped out in the factor and
reliability analyses for the modified ambulatory questionnaire.
While it is likely that many of these questions are not
appropriate in the ambulatory setting, it is also possible that
they have not been sufficiently adapted to be of use in the
ambulatory setting. Additionally, answers from nonclinical
staff were all dropped in the analysis as these members of the
care team did not feel they could respond to 25% or more of the
questions in the survey. Clearly, these nonclinical staff mem-
bers are critical parts of the care team, and their perceptions
are important. Future versions of the SAQ-A should be
modified to include this group.
As ambulatory safety culture tools are developed, it will be
critical to measure their clinical utility. For instance, do
institutions with lower indicators of a culture of safety have
more errors that reach patients? Can the instrument detect
changes in the culture over time? Can the instrument guide an
institution’s improvement process over time? Answering these
questions will require a number of studies across a large
number of ambulatory settings. While this work has been
repeatedly identified as the first step in the journey toward a
safe health care system, support for research of this nature is
very difficult to secure. Modak et al. have taken the first steps.
We can only hope that others will follow and that funding
organizations will be able to find the means to support these
important foundational efforts toward improving the safety of
care in the ambulatory setting, where most of us get most of
our care most of the time.
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